

SECRET

MGK-A-35595

Chief, Foreign Division M

20 December 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

Evaluation of KIBITZ 15 Materials

1. As we have attempted to illustrate in recent progress reports, the KIBITZ Project now has two distinct parts. The first is a group of Germans carefully recruited on an individual basis by [] and now being organized and trained in teams of three to five members. KIBITZ 15 has been permitted to recruit a second group which he is now arranging into teams and training. We, of course, consider the group recruited by [] to be the most secure and have the higher potential as regards stayability.

2. KIBITZ 15 now spends 95 percent of his time on his group. Due to his ambitious nature and our personnel shortages he passes us up in some areas of the work. One of these is the indoctrination and training of his group and we now find we must constructively criticize and redirect his effort as well as provide him with training materials. He has recently completed, with very little guidance, some instructions for his teams.

3. Attached is a translation of the material sent by KIBITZ 15 to one of his teams. It is submitted for constructive criticism. We should like your comments and particularly those of the authors of Field Notice No. 10-51 and the PASTIME publications mentioned therein. In connection with these publications the most recent ones reaching us have been D-23, 24, 25 and 28. We should especially like to see D-22 titled: Essential Intelligence Targets During the First Phase of Enemy Occupation.

4. Translation of the material was by [] whose comments appear on page A. []'s comments begin on page B.

5. Should you find that Training and/or the authors of Field Notice No. 10-51 have developed materials intended to be put into agents hands for self study, we would be very interested in receiving distribution.

Distribution:

- ~~2~~ - FDM w/2 atts.
- 1 - COS w/1 att.
- 1 - KOB w/1 att.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

SECRET

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

-A-

1. The style is inconsistent: at some points the author indulges in highflown political dialectics supposedly based on pure logic, at others he waves the flag madly while calling for 'higher, multilateral' etc. union of European peoples. All this is mutually contradictory and thoroughly confusing, but probably designed to appeal to all political shadings among his cohorts.

2. The emphasis of destruction of telltale papers is well taken, in view of the German penchant for reducing everything to writing. The author, on the contrary, seems to have no qualms about keeping voluminous files on much material which could easily be passed by word of mouth.

3. The EEI-briefs, while being cited as representing only a general orientation, are tremendously detailed. They also wander quite far afield at some points; (eg, (1) of Enclosure 10 (Transport and Communications): 'What ports, moles and docks are being improved, strengthened?'). This is rather odd in view of the constant theme of the entire folder, ie, coverage of the central Schwaben-Bayern area.

4. Briefing for steps to be taken in recruitment of radio operators, contact with couriers, etc., is much too vague. No mention is made of passwords, recognition and danger signals, inter-group communication, etc.

5. No A-F, 1-6 or equivalent evaluation system for reports is apparent.

6. No mention is made of safe houses, escape and evasion chains or routes (with exception of brief note on 'helicopter pickup' of Germans who may be of value to the Russians) or air drops.

SECRET